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Abstract:
This note considers an asymmetric duopoly model of price-frame competition in homogeneous product mar-
kets. The firms choose simultaneously prices and price formats, and frame differentiation limits price compa-
rability leading to consumer confusion. Here, one firm is more salient than its rival and attracts a larger share
of confused consumers. In duopoly equilibrium, the firms randomize on both prices and frames, make strictly
positive profits, and pricing is frame-independent. However, the prominent firm sets a higher average price
and charges the monopoly price with positive probability. Higher prominence boosts expected profit for both
the industry and the salient firm but may harm the rival’s expected profit.
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1 Introduction
In many homogeneous product markets firms’ prices are presented in differentiated formats. In grocery stores,
the same fruits or vegetables are priced ‘per unit’ or ‘per kg’. Some service providers quote a total price, while
others quote V.A.T. separately. Supermarket promotions are framed as direct price reductions, percentage dis-
counts, or volume discounts. Format differentiation may limit price comparability and lead to consumer con-
fusion or inertia. Confused consumers may uphold their default options, make mistakes, or restrict their con-
sideration sets. Markets with differentiated price formats often exhibit both price frame and price dispersion,
despite product homogeneity.
Theoretical models of price-frame competition mainly focus on symmetric settings where firms share con-
fused (or default-biased) consumers equally. Piccione and Spiegler (2012) formulate a duopoly model with a
general price frame comparability structure, while Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) analyze price-frame competi-
tion in oligopoly markets and its competition policy implications. As an exception, Spiegler (2011, Section 10.4)
considers a polar case where all consumers are initially assigned to one firm and uphold their default option
when frame differentiation blocks comparisons.1
When framing limits price comparability, confused consumers’ choices are likely to be affected by firm
prominence. Heavily advertised products enjoy higher recognition, which may influence consumers’ choices
when they cannot compare prices. Incumbent products are more salient and consumers who are familiar with
them may be less likely to switch to alternative products. Other sources of prominence include word-of-mouth,
social network recommendations, institutional default options, and preferential location in stores.2
This analysis allows for arbitrary prominence levels in duopoly markets where homogeneous product sell-
ers compete by choosing simultaneously both prices and one of two price frames. One frame is simple, while
the other can be simple or complex. Market composition is determined endogenously. When the firms choose
different frames, or when both choose a common complex frame, some consumers get confused. When both
firms choose the simple frame, all consumers can compare prices (i.e., are rational). It is assumed that frame
differentiation is the main source of confusion, that is, it leads to a larger share of confused consumers than
frame complexity. Confused consumers cannot compare prices and make random choices, but are more likely
to select the prominent product. Rational consumers buy from the lowest price firm.
There is no equilibrium where the firms choose pure price framing strategies. As the firms face heteroge-
neous consumers, there is no equilibrium where they choose pure price strategies either.3 I characterize the
mixed strategy duopoly Nash equilibrium and show that both firms randomize on prices and frames. Like
in the symmetric duopoly model, where the firms share equally the confused consumers, in equilibrium the
firms’ price framing strategies are independent of pricing. In my asymmetric model, the pricing strategies and
the expected profits depend on the degree of prominence, and so are firm-dependent, but framing strategies
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are firm-independent. The salient firm chooses a higher expected price, has an atom at the highest price equal
to consumers’ reservation value (so it is less likely to offer price promotions), and makes higher expected profit
than the rival.
This asymmetric model highlights how arbitrary levels of prominence affect the firms’ equilibrium strategies
and market outcomes. Specifically, an increase in prominence leads to increases in the salient firm’s probability
of choosing the highest price, in both firms’ expected prices, in the lower bound of firms’ price distributions, and
in the expected profits of the salient firm and the industry. The less salient firm’s expected profit may decrease
in the level of prominence. These insights complement the polar case where the prominent firm attracts all
confused consumers presented in Spiegler (2011, Section 10.4).
My analysis is also related to Gu and Wenzel (2014), who study prominence in a duopoly model where
the firms commit to complexity levels before competing in prices. This is relevant, for instance, when changes
in tariff design take time. They show that in equilibrium the firms choose deterministic complexity levels, but
randomize in prices, and that consumer protection policy may have undesired effects by inducing the less
salient firm to increase its complexity level. Their two-stage game is a sequential version of Carlin (2009). In
these models, price complexity (rather than format differentiation) is the main source of confusion. This is also
the case in Chioveanu (2017) where, unlike the current framework, consumer surplus is not monotonic in the
degree of prominence. 4
2 Model
Two firms supply a homogeneous product to a unit mass of consumers. Each consumer demands at most one
unit and has reservation value v = 1. The marginal production costs are normalized to zero. The firms choose
simultaneously and noncooperatively prices, 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, and price frames, 𝑧1 and 𝑧2. The timing reflects the fact
that the firms are able to change the price formats as frequently as they change the prices. Differentiation in
frames limits price comparability and leads to consumer confusion (or inertia). Each firm can choose one of two
frames, A and B. Frame A is simple (e.g., an all-inclusive price), and B is a different and possibly more complex
frame (e.g., a partitioned price). A frame is simple if two prices in this frame are perfectly comparable. A frame
is complex if some consumers cannot compare two prices presented in this frame. Frame B may also be simple
(but different from A): say, A is “price per unit” and B is “price per kilogram”.
If firms choose different frames, a share 𝛼(𝐴, 𝐵) ≡ 𝛼𝐻 > 0 of the consumers get confused, so cannot compare
prices, while a share 1− 𝛼𝐻 of the consumers are rational and purchase the cheapest product with positive net
surplus. If both firms choose A, all consumers are rational, that is, 𝛼(𝐴, 𝐴) ≡ 𝛼0 = 0. If both firms choose B, a
share 𝛼(𝐵, 𝐵) ≡ 𝛼𝐿 ≥ 0 of consumers get confused, while a share 1 − 𝛼𝐿 are rational. If 𝛼𝐿 = 0, all consumers
are rational. Simple frame A can cause confusion only when combined with frame B, whereas if 𝛼𝐿 > 0, B is
confusing itself and can limit comparability even if both firms choose it. In this model, frame differentiation is
more confusing than frame complexity, i.e. 𝛼𝐻 > 𝛼𝐿.
This analysis focuses on the interaction between price framing and firm prominence. Let firm 1 be more
prominent than its rival: confused consumers are more likely to purchase its product, and so are rational con-
sumers if the firms’ prices are equal. A fraction 𝜎 ∈ (1/2, 1) of the confused consumers buy from firm 1, while
fraction 1− 𝜎 buy from firm 2. If both firms offer equal prices, a fraction 𝜎 ∈ (1/2, 1) of the rational consumers
buy from firm 1 and 1 − 𝜎 buy from firm 2.5
Firm i’s profit is
𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗, 𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑗) = 𝑝𝑖 ⋅ [𝜎𝑖𝛼(𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑗) + 𝑞𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗)(1 − 𝛼(𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑗))] ,
where 𝜎𝑖 is firm i’s prominence level (with 𝜎1 = 𝜎 and 𝜎2 = 1 − 𝜎), 𝛼(𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑗) is the total share of confused




1, if 𝑝𝑖 < min{𝑝𝑗,1}
𝜎𝑖, if 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑗 ≤ 1
0, if 𝑝𝑖 > min{𝑝𝑗,1}
  for 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2} and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 . (1)
It is assumed that the confused consumers do not pay more than their reservation price and their choices are
independent of prices. Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) discuss these assumptions
and the microfoundations of the price-frame competition model.
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The following result characterizes the unique mixed strategy pricing equilibrium in a duopoly model where
firm 1 serves a larger fraction (𝜎 > 1/2) of an exogenously given share of confused consumers (α ∈ (0,1)) and is
recalled throughout this analysis.
Proposition 1
(Narasimhan, 1988) In the unique Nash equilibrium firms randomize on prices in [𝑝0, 1], with 𝑝0 implicitly defined
below, and make expected profits
𝜋1(𝛼) = 𝜎𝛼 = 𝑝0 [1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼] 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜋2(𝛼) =
𝜎𝛼(1 − 𝜎𝛼)
1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼 = 𝑝0 (1 − 𝜎𝛼) . (2)
The firms’ pricing c.d.f.s are
𝐹1(𝑝, 𝛼) =
1 − 𝜎𝛼
1 − 𝛼 −
𝜎𝛼(1 − 𝜎𝛼)
(1 − 𝛼) [1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼]
1





Firm 2’s pricing c.d.f. is continuous everywhere, while firm 1’s pricing c.d.f. is continuous on [𝑝0, 1)and has an atom
at p = 1,
𝜙(𝛼) = 1 − 𝐹1(1) =
(2𝜎 − 1)𝛼
1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼 ∈ (0, 1) . (4)
Lemma 1
There is no equilibrium where the duopolists use pure price framing strategies.   
Proof
(a) Suppose that both firms choose A. The unique candidate equilibrium entails marginal-cost pricing and
zero profit. If firm i unilaterally deviates to B and price 𝑝𝑖 ∈ (0, 1], it makes positive profit. A contradiction.
(b) Suppose that both firms choose B. As 𝛼𝐿 < 𝛼𝐻 ≤ 1, Proposition 1 applies and the profits in the candidate
equilibrium are given by eq. (2) when 𝛼 = 𝛼𝐿.6 But, if firm 1 deviates to A and price 𝑝1 = 1, it makes higher
profit 𝜎𝛼𝐻 > 𝜎𝛼𝐿. A contradiction.
(c) Suppose that firms i and j choose A and B, respectively. Consider two cases. (c1) When 𝛼𝐻 = 1, in the
unique candidate equilibrium 𝑝1 = 𝑝2 = 1, 𝜋1 = 𝜎 and 𝜋2 = 1 − 𝜎 . But, as σ < 1, if firm j deviates to A and
𝑝𝑗 = 1 − 𝜀, its profit is 1 − 𝜀 > 𝜎𝑗 for ∀𝜀 < 1 − 𝜎𝑗. A contradiction. (c2) When 𝛼𝐻 < 1, Proposition 1 applies and
profits in the candidate equilibrium are given by eq. (2) when 𝛼 = 𝛼𝐻 . But, as σ < 1, if firm j deviates to A and
price 𝑝𝑗 = 𝑝0, its profit is 𝑝0 > 𝑝0 [1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼𝐻]. A contradiction.7   
By Lemma 1, in any candidate equilibrium at least one firm randomizes on price frames.8 Therefore, with
positive probability the firms face both rational and confused consumers. The next result follows from Propo-
sition 1.
Lemma 2
There is no equilibrium where the duopolists use pure pricing strategies.
By Lemmas 1 and 2, any Nash equilibrium must exhibit dispersion in both prices and frames. Firm i’s
strategy space is [0,1] × {A,B}. Denote by 𝜉𝑖 ≡ 𝜉𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) firm i’s mixed strategy over prices and frames, for i = 1,2.
𝜉𝑖 is a bivariate c.d.f. where 𝐹𝑖(𝑝𝑖) is the marginal c.d.f. of firm i’s random price defined on a support 𝑇𝑖 ⊆ [0, 1],
while 𝜆𝑖(𝑝𝑖) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 [𝑧𝑖 = 𝐴 ∣ 𝑝𝑖] and 1−𝜆𝑖(𝑝𝑖) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 [𝑧𝑖 = 𝐵 ∣ 𝑝𝑖] are firm i’s probabilities of using frame A and,
respectively, frame B at price 𝑝𝑖. Firm i’s overall probability of using A is 𝜆𝑖 = ∫𝑝𝑖∈𝑇𝑖 𝜆𝑖(𝑝𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝑖(𝑝𝑖). For 𝜉𝑖 to be
well-defined, 𝐹𝑖(𝑝𝑖) should be weakly increasing on 𝑇𝑖 and 𝜆𝑖(𝑝𝑖) ∈ [0, 1] for all 𝑝𝑖 ∈ 𝑇𝑖.
Suppose that firm j ≠ i follows 𝜉𝑗, so it draws its price from 𝐹𝑗(𝑝𝑗). Firm i’s expected profit at price 𝑝𝑖 and
frame 𝑧𝑖 is
𝜋𝑖 (𝑝𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖 ∫𝑝𝑗>𝑝𝑖 [𝜆𝑗(𝑝𝑗)(1 − 𝛼(𝑧𝑖, 𝐴)) + (1 − 𝜆𝑗(𝑝𝑗))(1 − 𝛼(𝑧𝑖, 𝐵))] 𝑑𝐹𝑗(𝑝𝑗) + (5)
𝑝𝑖𝜎𝑖 ∫𝑝𝑗∈𝑇𝑗 [𝜆𝑗(𝑝𝑗)𝛼(𝑧𝑖, 𝐴) + (1 − 𝜆𝑗(𝑝𝑗))𝛼(𝑧𝑖, 𝐵)] 𝑑𝐹𝑗(𝑝𝑗) .
The first integral gives firm i’s share of rational consumers, while the second gives the overall share of
confused consumers. The first term in square brackets represents the expected share of rational consumers for
a given realization of 𝑝𝑗. With probability 𝜆𝑗(𝑝𝑗), firm j uses A and the expected share of rational consumers
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is (1 − 𝛼(𝑧𝑖, 𝐴)); with probability 1 − 𝜆𝑗(𝑝𝑗), firm j uses B and the expected share of rational consumers is
(1 − 𝛼(𝑧𝑖, 𝐵)). The second term in square brackets represents the expected share of confused consumers for a
given realization of 𝑝𝑗. As j’s price 𝑝𝑗 is stochastic, these shares are integrated over all 𝑝𝑗’s. Firm i serves the
rational consumers if its rival’s price is higher (𝑝𝑗 > 𝑝𝑖) and serves a share 𝜎𝑖 of confused consumers for all 𝑝𝑗’s.
Equation (5) applies for any price 𝑝𝑖, as 𝐹𝑗(𝑝𝑗) = 0 for 𝑝𝑗 ≤ inf 𝑇𝑗 and 𝐹𝑗(𝑝𝑗) = 1 for 𝑝𝑗 ≥ sup 𝑇𝑗.
Lemmata 3 - 6 in the appendix explore properties of the pricing c.d.f.s, and show that both firms choose
prices according to c.d.f.s defined on a common interval 𝑇 = [𝑝0, 1] and continuous everywhere except possibly
at p = 1.
Using eq. (5) for 𝑧𝑖 = 𝐴 and 𝑧𝑖 = 𝐵, firm i’s incremental profitability of switching from frame A to B is
𝜋𝑖 (𝑝𝑖, 𝐵) − 𝜋𝑖 (𝑝𝑖, 𝐴) = 𝑝𝑖Δ𝑖(𝑝𝑖) , where
Δ𝑖(𝑝𝑖) = − ∫
1
𝑝𝑖




Λ𝑗(𝑝𝑗) = [−(𝛼𝐻 − 𝛼𝐿) + (2𝛼𝐻 − 𝛼𝐿) 𝜆𝑗(𝑝𝑗)] .
Firm i is indifferent between frames A and B at price 𝑝𝑖 (i.e., 𝜆𝑖(𝑝𝑖) ∈ (0, 1)) iff 𝜋𝑖 (𝑝𝑖, 𝐵) = 𝜋𝑖 (𝑝𝑖, 𝐴). Equation
(6) also indicates that if Λ𝑗(𝑝𝑗) = 0 for all 𝑝𝑗’s then 𝜋𝑖 (𝑝𝑖, 𝐵) = 𝜋𝑖 (𝑝𝑖, 𝐴) for any 𝑝𝑖, where
Λ𝑗(𝑝𝑗) = 0 ⇔ 𝜆𝑗(𝑝𝑗) =
𝛼𝐻 − 𝛼𝐿
2𝛼𝐻 − 𝛼𝐿
≡ 𝜆 ∈ (0, 1) . (7)
Let 𝐹𝑧𝑖𝑖 (𝑝𝑖) = 𝐹𝑖(𝑝𝑖) ⋅ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 [𝑧𝑖 ∣ 𝑝𝑖] be firm i’s price distribution conditional on using frame 𝑧𝑖. I focus on
equilibria where the support of 𝐹𝑧𝑖𝑖 (𝑝𝑖) is a connected interval, for i = 1,2 and 𝑧𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵. This requires that
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 [𝑧𝑖 ∣ 𝑝𝑖] ∈ (0, 1) ⇔ Δ𝑖(𝑝𝑖) = 0 and 𝑑Δ𝑖(𝑝𝑖)/𝑑𝑝𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑝𝑖 ∈ 𝑇.
Using eq. (6), Leibnitz’s rule implies that
𝑑Δ𝑖(𝑝𝑖)/𝑑𝑝𝑖 = [−(𝛼𝐻 − 𝛼𝐿) + (2𝛼𝐻 − 𝛼𝐿) 𝜆𝑗(𝑝𝑖)] 𝑓𝑗(𝑝𝑖) so
𝑑Δ𝑖(𝑝𝑖)/𝑑𝑝𝑖 = 0 ⇔ 𝜆𝑗(𝑝𝑖) = 𝜆 for 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑖 ∈ 𝑇.
Proposition 2
In any duopoly equilibrium with connected supports, there is price-frame independence. At any price p ∈ T, firm i (i
= 1,2) chooses frame A with probability 𝜆𝑖(𝑝) = 𝜆 and frame B with probability (1 − 𝜆), where λ is defined in eq. (7).
Denote the equilibrium expected share of confused consumers by






, 𝛼𝐻) . (8)
Substituting for λ into eq. (5) and using eq. (8), firm i ’s expected profit at price p becomes
𝜋𝑖 (𝑝) = 𝑝 [(1 − 𝛼𝑒) (1 − 𝐹𝑗(𝑝)) + 𝜎𝑖𝛼𝑒] . (9)
The analysis of firms’ pricing strategies echoes Narasimhan (1988). The next result follows from Proposition
1 by using the expected share of confused consumers in eq. (8).
Proposition 3
There exists a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium where each firm adopts frame A with probability λ given in eq. (7)
and frame B with probability 1− 𝜆. The expected share of confused consumers is given by 𝛼𝑒 in eq. (8). Using eqs. (2), (3),
and (4), the firms’ pricing distributions, defined on [𝑝∗0 , 1] with 𝑝∗0 = 𝜎𝛼𝑒/ [1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼𝑒], and firm 1’s atom at p = 1
are
𝐹∗1(𝑝) = 𝐹∗1(𝑝, 𝛼𝑒), 𝐹∗2(𝑝) = 𝐹∗2(𝑝, 𝛼𝑒), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜙∗ = 𝜙(𝛼𝑒),
while the expected profits are
𝜋∗1 = 𝜋1(𝛼𝑒) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜋∗2 = 𝜋2(𝛼𝑒).
In the duopoly equilibrium each firm’s pricing is frame-independent, but firm-dependent due to promi-
nence. As 𝛼𝐻 > 𝛼𝐿, when a firm switches from frame A to B, more (less) consumers get confused if the rival
uses A (B). Therefore, there is no obvious monotonic relationship between the prices associated with A and B.
The value of λ in Proposition 2 equates the expected total number of confused consumers when a firm uses
frame A and when it uses frame B, i.e. (1 − 𝜆) 𝛼𝐻 = 𝜆𝛼𝐻 + (1 − 𝜆) 𝛼𝐿.
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The prominent firm makes higher profits than the rival (𝜋∗1 > 𝜋∗2 ), puts positive probability on the monopoly
price (𝜙∗ > 0), and charges higher average price (𝐹∗2(𝑝) > 𝐹∗1(𝑝)).9 As it serves a larger fraction of the expected
share of confused consumers, it has weaker incentives to offer price promotions. Hence, in markets with price-
frame competition, a prominent firm is less likely to offer promotions. Comparative statics results are presented
below.
Corollary 1
(i) 𝜙∗ strictly increases in σ and 𝛼𝑒. (ii) 𝑝∗0 strictly increases, so the range of prices strictly decreases, in σ and 𝛼𝑒. (iii)
exp (𝑝2) = exp (𝑝1 ∣ 𝑝1 < 1) and exp (𝑝1) strictly increase in σ and 𝛼𝑒.
Total welfare is normalized to one, so an increase in expected industry profit (𝜋∗) corresponds to an equal
reduction in expected consumer surplus. Using eq. (2),
𝜋∗ = 𝜋∗1 + 𝜋∗2 = 𝜋∗ = 𝜎𝛼𝑒
2 − 𝛼𝑒
1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼𝑒 = 𝛼
𝑒 + (2𝜎 − 1)(1 − 𝛼
𝑒)𝛼𝑒
1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼𝑒 .
Corollary 2
Profits and Prominence. 𝜋∗ and 𝜋∗1 strictly increase in σ. 𝜋∗2 may increase or decrease in σ depending on the con-
fusion level.
When 𝛼𝑒 ≤ 0.382, 𝜋∗2 increases in σ; when 𝛼𝑒 > 0.66, it decreases in σ; and when 𝛼𝑒 ∈ (0.382, 0.66] it increases
in σ for 𝜎 ∈ (1/2, ?̄?) and it decreases in σ for 𝜎 ∈ (?̄?, 1), where ?̄? = [√(1 − 𝛼𝑒)(2 − 𝛼𝑒) − (1 − 𝛼𝑒)] / 𝛼𝑒.
Corollary 3
Profits and Confusion. 𝜋∗ and 𝜋∗1 strictly increase in 𝛼𝑒. 𝜋∗2 may increase or decrease in 𝛼𝑒 depending on the
prominence level.
When σ ∈ (0.5,0.62], 𝜋∗2 increases in 𝛼𝑒. When σ ∈ (0.62,1), 𝜋∗2 increases in 𝛼𝑒 for 𝛼𝑒 ∈ (0, 𝛼𝑒) and decreases
in 𝛼𝑒 for 𝛼𝑒 ∈ (𝛼𝑒, 1), where 𝛼𝑒 = 1/[𝜎 + √𝜎(2𝜎 − 1)].
Spiegler (2011, Section 10.4) discusses a default-bias model where all consumers are initially assigned to one
firm, which corresponds to σ = 1. There, the prominent firm serves all confused consumers, while the rival can
only sell to rational consumers, and both firms randomize in prices and frames. The case with symmetric firms
(𝜎 = 1/2) is subsumed by Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013). These results can be
derived from mine by letting 𝜎 → 1 and 𝜎 → 1/2, respectively. This note complements the existing literature by




The pricing supports, 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 are connected intervals (i.e., there are no gaps in either of them).   
Proof
Let 𝑇 = 𝑇1 ∩ 𝑇2. (a) Suppose that there is a gap G in T. (i) Suppose that firm i does not have mass over G
but firm j does. Let 𝑝𝑎 = sup{𝑝 ∈ 𝑇𝑖 ∣ 𝑝 < inf 𝐺} and 𝑝𝑏 = inf{𝑝 ∈ 𝑇𝑖 ∣ 𝑝 > sup 𝐺}. Then 𝜋𝑗(𝑝, 𝑧𝑗, 𝜉𝑖) is strictly
increasing in p for p ∈ G and firm j is better off moving mass 𝐹𝑗(𝑝𝑏) − 𝐹𝑗(𝑝𝑎) to 𝑝𝑏. A contradiction. (ii) Suppose
that neither firm has mass over G. Let 𝑝𝑐 = sup{𝑝 ∈ (𝑇𝑖 ∪ 𝑇𝑗) ∣ 𝑝 < inf 𝐺}. (i) implies that 𝑝𝑐 ∈ 𝑇𝑖 for i = 1,2. But
then 𝐹𝑖(𝑝𝑐) = 𝐹𝑖(inf 𝐺) = 𝐹𝑖(sup 𝐺) and firm j is better off moving mass from 𝑝𝑐 to 𝑝′ = sup 𝐺. A contradiction.
(b) Suppose that there is a gap 𝐺 ⊂ 𝑇𝑖⧹𝑇. There exists either 𝑝𝑎 or 𝑝𝑏 as defined in (a-i), or both. Firm i is better
off moving mass either from 𝑝𝑎 to supG or from infG to 𝑝𝑏. A contradiction.   
Lemma 4
(i) Neither firm has an atom in the interior or at the lower bound of the rival’s pricing support. (ii) Firm i cannot have
an atom at the upper bound of 𝑇𝑗 if firm j has an atom there.   
Proof
(i) Suppose that firm j has an atom at some 𝑝′ ∈ 𝑇𝑗 with 𝑝′ < max 𝑇𝑗. It must be that 𝑝′ ∈ 𝑇𝑖, otherwise
firm j would move the atom to a higher price. Then, if 𝛼(𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑗) < 1, firm i is better off deviating from (𝑝, 𝑧𝑖) to
(𝑝′ − 𝜖, 𝑧′𝑖) as there is a discrete increase in market share and only a marginal decrease in price. If 𝛼(𝑧𝑖, 𝑧𝑗) = 1,
firm i is better off deviating from (𝑝, 𝑧𝑖) to (𝑝′ − 𝜖, 𝑧′𝑖) for ε > 0 and 𝑧′𝑖 ≠ 𝑧𝑖.
(ii) Suppose that firm j has an atom at 𝑝′ = max 𝑇𝑗. If firm i also has an atom at 𝑝′, then the deviation
argument in (i) applies unchanged. So, both firms cannot have atoms at max 𝑇𝑗.
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In equilibrium, it must be that 𝑇1 = 𝑇2 = [𝑝0, 𝑝ℎ] for 𝑝0 < 𝑝ℎ ≤ 1.   
Proof
Suppose that ∃𝑝′ ∈ 𝑇𝑖 s.t. 𝑝′ ∉ 𝑇𝑗. Let 𝐴 = {𝑝 ∈ 𝑇𝑗 ∣ 𝑝 > 𝑝′}. Suppose that 𝐴 ≠ ∅ and let 𝑝′′ = min 𝐴. Then,
𝜋𝑖(𝑝′′, 𝑧𝑖, 𝜉𝑗) > 𝜋𝑖(𝑝′, 𝑧𝑖, 𝜉𝑗) as firm i does not lose market share when deviating from 𝑝′ to 𝑝′′. If 𝐴 = ∅, it must
be that 𝑝′ > max 𝑇𝑗. If 𝑝′ < 1, a similar argument applies as 𝜋𝑖(1, 𝑧𝑖, 𝜉𝑗) > 𝜋𝑖(𝑝′, 𝑧𝑖, 𝜉𝑗). If 𝑝′ = 1 (i.e., max 𝑇𝑖 = 1
), max 𝑇𝑗 ≤ 1. Then, by Lemma 4, the firms cannot have an atom at max 𝑇𝑗, so at least one firm can profitably
deviate to 𝑝′ = 1 from 𝑝 = max 𝑇𝑗. Therefore, it must be that if 𝑝′ ∈ 𝑇𝑖 then 𝑝′ ∈ 𝑇𝑗.   
Lemma 6
In equilibrium, sup 𝑇1 = sup 𝑇2 = 1 and 𝑝0 > 0.   
Proof
Suppose that sup 𝑇𝑖 < 1. By Lemma 5, sup 𝑇𝑗 = sup 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑝ℎ. By Lemma 4, both firms cannot have atoms at
𝑝ℎ. Then, at least one firm serves only its confused consumer base at 𝑝ℎ and is better off charging 𝑝 = 1 > 𝑝ℎ. A
contradiction. By Lemma 1, at least one firm mixes on frames. Thus, the expected confused consumer share and
the firms’ profits when 𝑝 → 1 are strictly positive. The constant profit conditions for mixed strategy equilibrium
then imply that 𝑝0 > 0.   
Proof of Corollary 1
(i) 𝜕𝜙∗/𝜕𝜎 = 𝛼𝑒(2 − 𝛼𝑒)/ [1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼𝑒]2 > 0 and 𝜕𝜙/𝜕𝛼𝑒 = (2𝜎 − 1)/ [1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼𝑒]2 > 0.
(ii) 𝜕𝑝0/𝜕𝜎 = 𝛼𝑒(1 − 𝛼𝑒)/ [1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼𝑒]2 > 0 and 𝜕𝑝0/ 𝜕𝛼𝑒 = 𝜎/ [1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼𝑒]2 > 0.
(iii) Consider firm 2. exp(𝑝2) = ∫1𝑝0(1 − 𝐹2(𝑝2))𝑑𝑝2 + 𝑝0 = −𝜎𝛼
𝑒 ln 𝑝0/(1 − 𝛼𝑒)− 𝜎𝛼𝑒/(1 − 𝛼𝑒)(1 − 𝑝0)+ 𝑝0 =
−𝜎𝛼𝑒 ln 𝑝0/(1 − 𝛼𝑒).
Denoting 𝜎𝛼𝑒/ (1 − 𝛼𝑒) ≡τ, exp(𝑝2) = 𝜏 ln(1 + 1/𝜏) with 𝜕[exp(𝑝2)]/𝜕𝜏 > 0 as τ > 0.
𝜕[exp(𝑝2)]/𝜕𝜎 = (𝜕[exp(𝑝2)]/𝜕𝜏) (𝜕𝜏/𝜕𝜎) > 0. 𝜕[exp(𝑝2)]/𝜕𝛼𝑒 = (𝜕[exp(𝑝2)]/𝜕𝜏) (𝜕𝜏/𝜕𝛼𝑒) > 0.
Consider firm 1. Note that 𝐹1(𝑝)/ 𝐹1(1) = 𝐹2(𝑝) so exp (𝑝1 ∣ 𝑝1 < 1) = exp (𝑝2).
exp(𝑝1) = exp(𝑝2)𝐹1(1) + (1 − 𝐹1(1)) = exp(𝑝2)(1 − 𝜙∗) + 𝜙∗. 𝜕[exp(𝑝1)]/𝜕𝜎 = (𝜕[exp(𝑝2)]/𝜕𝜎) (1 − 𝜙∗)−
exp(𝑝2) (𝜕𝜙∗/𝜕𝜎) + 𝜕𝜙∗/𝜕𝜎 = (𝜕[exp(𝑝2)]/𝜕𝜎) (1 − 𝜙∗)+ (1 − exp(𝑝2)) (𝜕𝜙∗/𝜕𝜎) > 0.
𝜕[exp(𝑝1)]/𝜕𝛼𝑒 = (𝜕[exp(𝑝2)]/𝜕𝛼𝑒) (1 − 𝜙∗)− exp(𝑝2) (𝜕𝜙∗/𝜕𝛼𝑒) + 𝜕𝜙∗/𝜕𝛼𝑒 = (𝜕[exp(𝑝2)]/𝜕𝛼𝑒) (1 − 𝜙∗)+
(1 − exp(𝑝2)) (𝜕𝜙∗/𝜕𝛼𝑒) > 0.
Proof of Corollary 2
𝜕𝜋∗/𝜕𝜎 = 𝛼𝑒(1 − 𝛼𝑒)(2 − 𝛼𝑒)/ [1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼𝑒]2 > 0 and 𝜕𝜋∗1 /𝜕𝜎 = 𝛼𝑒 > 0.
𝜕𝜋∗2 /𝜕𝜎 = 𝛼𝑒[1 − 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝜎𝛼𝑒(1 − 𝛼𝑒) − 𝜎2 (𝛼𝑒)
2]/ [1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼𝑒]2.
So 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝜕𝜋∗2 /𝜕𝜎) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛[1 − 𝛼𝑒 − 2𝜎𝛼𝑒(1 − 𝛼𝑒) − 𝜎2 (𝛼𝑒)
2]. The term in square brackets is an inverted-U
quadratic, with roots 𝜎 < 0 and ?̄? = [√(1 − 𝛼𝑒)(2 − 𝛼𝑒) − (1 − 𝛼𝑒)] / 𝛼𝑒 > 0, and positive at the maximum.
Then, 𝜋∗2 increases for 𝜎 ∈ (𝜎, ?̄?) and decreases for 𝜎 > ?̄? . If ?̄? ≥ 1, 𝜋∗2 increases for ∀ 𝜎 ∈ (1/2, 1). This
happens when 𝛼𝑒 ≤ 0.382. If ?̄? < 1/2, then 𝜋∗2 decreases for all 𝜎 ∈ (1/2, 1). This happens for 𝛼𝑒 > 0.66. For
𝛼𝑒 ∈ (0.382, 0.66], ?̄? ∈ [1/2, 1) and 𝜋∗2 first increases and then decreases.   
Proof of Corollary 3
𝜕𝜋∗/𝜕𝛼𝑒 = 𝜎 [2(1 − 𝛼𝑒) + (1 − 𝜎) (𝛼𝑒)2] / [1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼𝑒]2 > 0 and 𝜕𝜋∗1 /𝜕𝛼𝑒 =σ > 0.
𝜕𝜋∗2 /𝜕𝛼𝑒 = 𝜎[𝜎(1 − 𝜎) (𝛼𝑒)
2 − 2𝜎𝛼𝑒 + 1]/ [1 − (1 − 𝜎)𝛼𝑒]2.
So 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝜕𝜋∗2 /𝜕𝛼𝑒) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛[𝜎(1 − 𝜎) (𝛼𝑒)
2 − 2𝜎𝛼𝑒 + 1]. The quadratic in square brackets is U-shaped, with
positive roots ̄𝛼𝑒 = [𝜎 − √𝜎(2𝜎 − 1)]−1 (where ̄𝛼𝑒 > 2 for 𝜎 ∈ (1/2, 1)) and 𝛼𝑒 = 1/[𝜎 + √𝜎(2𝜎 − 1)]. For
𝜎 ≤ 0.62, 𝛼𝑒 ≥ 1 and 𝜕𝜋∗2 /𝜕𝛼𝑒 > 0. For σ > 0.62, 𝛼𝑒 ∈ (0, 1) and the result follows.   
Notes
1 Spiegler (2016) provides a review of related literature.
2 Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) and Armstrong and Zhou (2011) discuss sources of prominence and provide related evidence.
3 See the intuition in Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988). Unlike their models where consumer heterogeneity is exogenous, in my setting
price frame competition endogenizes consumer heterogeneity.
4 A wider message from these duopoly analyses is that an increase in prominence harms consumers if equilibrium pricing is frame-
independent or if firms commit to price formats before competing in prices but it may benefit consumers if equilibrium pricing is frame-
dependant. However, while all these papers explore strategic obfuscation in markets with confused consumers, they apply to different
economic environments.
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5 The results carry over unchanged if rational consumers are equally likely to choose either product when they are indifferent between
them. But, my formulation fits better a default-bias interpretation, where a share σ of consumers are initially assigned to firm 1.
6 The firms’ frame choices endogenize the share of confused consumers, but so long as α∈(0,1), Narasimhan’s result applies because there
are both confused and rational consumers.
7 (a) and (c) used the fact that 𝛼0 = 0, but the result still holds if 𝛼0 ∈ (0, 𝛼𝐻) (the reasoning in (b) applies).
8 Lemma 1 focuses on markets where σ < 1. However, the result carries over to the case where σ = 1 (with some modifications to the
deviations in part (c) of the proof).
9 These results follow from Narasimhan (1988).
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